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COMMENT
How the Rise of the Daily Fantasy Sports
Industry Can Catalyze the Liberalization of
Sports Betting Policies in the United States
BRENDAN F. CONLEY†
It is a crisp Sunday afternoon in the autumn of 2015, and
football fanatics from all across the United States, and the
world, are situated in front of their high definition television
sets, anxiously awaiting the kickoff of their favorite National
Football League (NFL) team’s game. Hope abounds, and
significant playoff implications permeate the weekend slate
of games. Yet, for millions of these fans, attention quickly
shifts elsewhere.
For these individuals, it is standard to find laptop
computers positioned adjacent to them on the sofa, open to
FanDuel’s “Live” page, whereby they can continuously
monitor the progress of their lineups—or “entries”—in the
variety of different “contests” offered on the site, if they so
choose. However, their immediate attention is still
elsewhere. To be sure, the home team’s game remains on in
the background, and these individuals are still vaguely
attuned to what is taking place on the field, but their eyes
are truly fixated on their laptops and mobile devices. By now,
having fully committed the players in their various fantasy
lineups to memory, these devices become precious sources of
the real-time information, upon which the hopes and dreams
of this group of daily fantasy football participants will
subsequently rise and fall.
As the third quarter of the home team’s game concludes,
† Note & Comment Editor, Buffalo Law Review.
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the national broadcast transitions to a commercial break and
yet another advertisement for DraftKings, FanDuel’s
primary competitor, flickers onto the screen and depicts
seemingly everyday people winning life-altering cash
payouts. The commercial concludes with the now-familiar
phrase: “This isn’t fantasy as usual. This is DraftKings.
Welcome to the big time.”1
At this point, while games across the country move to the
fourth quarter, the daily fantasy player’s attention oscillates
between nervously checking the up-to-the-minute scoring
status of their active lineups and intently studying the outof-town scores, game situations, and player statistics via
their preferred smartphone applications. All these
individuals can do is idly watch, as their financial fortunes
are determined by what is taking place in NFL stadiums
located thousands of miles away. It is a helpless feeling, yet
it is also utterly captivating.
In these moments, the allocation of thousands of dollars
will oftentimes quite literally turn on a single yard gained or
lost. One touchdown can mean the difference between
winning hundreds of thousands of dollars and
unceremoniously losing the entirety of an entry fee with
nothing to show for the time, energy, and money spent in the
process. None of this is impervious to human error either: a
poorly spotted football, an improper penalty call, or a
statistician’s error can be the deciding factor when the
margins between victory and defeat are this slim. Daily
fantasy players are fully cognizant of the imperfect nature of
the game, particularly on afternoons such as this one, but
they also realize they are all playing under the same
umbrella of uncertainty. And one of them is about to become
a millionaire.
As the game clocks begin to wind down around the

1. Don Van Natta Jr., Welcome to the Big Time, ESPN MAG. (Aug. 24, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/17374929/otl-investigates-implosio
n-daily-fantasy-sports-leaders-draftkings-fanduel.
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league, the daily fantasy player’s anxiety is palpable. But, for
as stressful as it can be at times, there is also a certain thrill
that comes with being along for the ride on these Sunday
afternoons. The adrenaline rush has an addictive quality to
it, and the hope of potentially winning an enormous cash
payout can be intoxicating, whereas the defeats can be
bitterly disappointing.
This all feels an awful lot like gambling. But how could
it be? FanDuel and DraftKings have both very publicly been
permitted to grow into billion-dollar enterprises2 over the
course of several years,3 and they combine to feature highprofile sponsorship deals with the National Basketball
Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), and
Major League Baseball (MLB).4 Two prominent NFL
franchise owners—Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones and
New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft—even have
equity stakes in DraftKings.5 The two companies have each
spent millions of dollars on advertisements, including
signage in NFL stadiums across the country6 and, perhaps
most notably, television commercials that air every ninety
seconds, on average.7 So, despite ostensibly displaying many
of the traditional features of illegal online gambling
operations, it seems unfathomable to think that these daily
fantasy sports companies could get away with such a brash
and public showing if there was any doubt whatsoever as to
the legality of their business models. Maybe daily fantasy

2. Id.; Brad Tuttle, Why Betting on Fantasy Sports is Legal but Betting on
Regular Sports is Not, MONEY (Sept. 10, 2015), http://time.com/money/
4029443/fantasy-sports-betting-legal/.
3. Van Natta, supra note 1.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id.; Brent Schrotenboer, FanDuel Signs Deals with 15 NFL Teams,
Escalating Daily Fantasy Integration, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2015, 10:42 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2015/04/21/daily-fantasy-sports-fandueldraftkings-nfl-mlb-nhl-nba/26149961/.
7. Van Natta, supra note 1.
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sports contests really are “games of skill”8 after all . . .
INTRODUCTION
For several years, the daily fantasy sports industry was
inexplicably permitted to operate under a veil of legal
uncertainty, based largely upon the industry’s own
conceptions and interpretations of existing federal and state
law.9 To say that the foremost daily fantasy companies,
FanDuel and DraftKings, had isolated some sort of legal
loophole—through which they could build their companies
and grow their business models—would be grossly
misleading, for it implies a somewhat solid, if not remote and
limited, legal footing. However, at most, these two pioneers
of the daily fantasy industry had simply identified a legal
gray area, a small crack in the regulatory armor targeting
illegal online gambling operations, through which they could
at least make an argument for the legitimacy of their
operations; and they wasted little time in doing so.
By creatively and strategically marketing their services
as being akin to traditional fantasy sports products, when
convenient, and continuously labeling them as “games of
skill” in which the most knowledgeable and talented players
typically prevail, the companies were largely able to
discourage and ward off public skepticism and investigative
scrutiny.10 This was done while simultaneously juxtaposing
that public approach with their pitches to investors behind
closed doors, which would often allude to the similarities
between the daily fantasy business models and those of

8. Id. Noting that, even in early meetings, FanDuel’s founder, Nigel Eccles,
“was a passionate evangelist for daily fantasy sports as a game of skill . . . .”
9. See id.
10. See id. (noting that the companies existed in the same legislative
landscape for several years, during which time they branded themselves as
games of skill publicly, while privately pitching investors on their similarities to
traditional online gambling products).
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traditional illegal online gambling operations.11 This was an
extremely audacious strategy, yet it worked almost
flawlessly for about half a decade,12 during which time
FanDuel and DraftKings both grew into billion-dollar
enterprises.13
From the advent of his company, FanDuel’s chief
executive officer, Nigel Eccles, believed that existing law
provided a “safe harbor” for daily fantasy sports,14 although
he did demonstrate a certain degree of wariness concerning
the lack of uniformity in the relevant state laws.15 But, as
each successive year came and passed without issue, those
following the industry seemed to grow increasingly less
concerned with any potential legality problems facing the
daily fantasy companies. Meanwhile, the progressively
brazen marketing behaviors of the industry leaders certainly
exuded an aura of confidence concerning their legal
statuses.16 Though, as it turned out, the companies’ legal
footing was actually quite tenuous all along.
When the day of legal reckoning finally did come for the
daily fantasy industry, the State of New York was at the
forefront, with State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman
serving as the proverbial leader of the charge.17 On
11. Id.
12. See id. (recognizing that FanDuel was founded in 2009, DraftKings was
founded in 2011, and New York’s cease and desist order ultimately came in
November 2015).
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id. (quoting Eccles’ advice to the daily fantasy industry in which he
warned them to “avoid the use of gambling terms in the promotion and marketing
of their games.”).
16. See id.
17. Walt Bogdanich et al., Attorney General Tells DraftKings and FanDuel to
Stop Taking Entries in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/sports/football/draftkings-fanduel-new-yor
k-attorney-general-tells-fantasy-sites-to-stop-taking-bets-in-new-york.html;
Drew Olanoff, NY State Rules Daily Fantasy Illegal, Ordering FanDuel and
DraftKings to Stop Taking Bets, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 10, 2015),
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November 10, 2015, Schneiderman sent separate letters to
FanDuel and DraftKings requesting that both companies
cease and desist operations in New York State.18 The letters
went on to explain that, upon his investigation,
Schneiderman concluded the sites were in fact online
gambling operations, which were thereby illegal under
Article I, Section 9 of the New York State Constitution.19 One
week later, on November 17, 2015, the New York State Office
of the Attorney General filed a court motion seeking a
preliminary injunction against the two giants of the daily
fantasy sports industry.20
New York was technically the second state to issue a
cease and desist order against FanDuel and DraftKings,
thereby banning them from operating within the state.21
However, the first state to do so, Nevada, did not act because
of any perceived illegality with the business models of either
company.22 In fact, daily fantasy sports are perfectly legal
under Nevada law, provided that daily fantasy operators
obtain a state-issued license.23 Therefore, the Nevada “ban”
was actually a licensure dispute, since neither FanDuel nor
DraftKings had obtained operating licenses to do business

https://techcrunch.com/2015/11/10/ny-attorney-general-rules-daily-fantasy-sport
s-illegal-orders-sites-to-cease-and-desist/.Van Natta, supra note 1.
18. Van Natta, supra note 1.
19. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 3–4, 13–14, 19, People v. FanDuel, Inc., (No. 453056/15), 2015 WL
9273711 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter People v. FanDuel Motion].
20. Id.
21. Nigel Duara, States Crack Down on Fantasy Sports, Calling Them Games
of Chance, Not Skill, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2016, 12:10 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-fantasy-sports-bans-20160102story.html.
22. Howard Stutz, Year is Shaping Up a Make or Break for Daily Fantasy
Sports
Industry,
L.V.
REV.-J.
(Mar.
1,
2016,
1:37
PM),
http://www.reviewjournal.com/inside-gaming/year-shaping-make-or-breakdaily-fantasy-sports-industry.
23. Id. (citing the Chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board as saying,
“No one said daily fantasy sports was illegal. . . . All we said is play by the rules.”).
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within the state.24 As such, Schneiderman’s actions in this
matter truly were unprecedented at the time. However,
several other states subsequently followed New York’s lead
and proceeded to raise varying degrees of doubt regarding
the legality of daily fantasy sports operations.25
As more states subsequently took action with regard to
the daily fantasy sports industry, New York remained at the
epicenter of the issue. New York is extremely important from
the standpoint of the daily fantasy sports companies because
it is the second largest state market for daily fantasy in the
country, behind only California. Just in 2015, New York
users accounted for $267 million dollars in entry fees across
the industry.26 Additionally, FanDuel is headquartered in
New York,27 and as of 2016, the company employed 160
people in its New York City offices alone.28 Therefore, having
to cease operations in New York was a particularly
damaging, if not outright devastating, blow to the industry
leaders.
In response to Schneiderman’s ban, and despite their
bitter rivalry, FanDuel and DraftKings decided to pool their
resources together to defend the legality of their services,
while simultaneously and vigorously lobbying for legislative
action that would expressly legalize daily fantasy sports in

24. Duara, supra note 21. It is, however, noteworthy that the Nevada
Attorney General did equate daily fantasy sports with “sports pools and gambling
games,” because, while such operations are legal in Nevada, this is not the case
in other states. Id.
25. Stutz, supra note 22.
26. See, e.g., Dan Adams, N.Y. Assembly Passes Daily Fantasy Sports Bill,
BOS. GLOBE (June 17, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/
2016/06/17/assembly-passes-daily-fantasy-sports-bill/wMCZKZDIHhIAwnawafd
96H/story.html.
27. Paul Sawers, How FanDuel Grew from Humble Scottish Startup into an
American Fantasy Sports Giant, VENTUREBEAT (May 22, 2016, 10:38 AM),
http://venturebeat.com/2016/05/22/how-fanduel-grew-from-humble-scottishstartup-into-an-american-fantasy-sports-giant/.
28. Id.
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contested states, such as New York.29 Eventually, the two
industry leaders won a hard-fought and monumental victory
when New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Senate Bill
8153, “An Act to Amend the Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering
and Breeding Law, in Relation to the Registration and
Regulation of Interactive Fantasy Sports Contests,” into
law.30 The bill not only legalized daily fantasy sports in New
York by declaring it to be a game of skill—thereby potentially
saving the industry—but also introduced a number of
regulations and consumer safeguards.31 The bill did not come
without controversy though, and Eric Schneiderman’s
complete reversal of opinion, with respect to the issue,
invited a fair amount of criticism from anti-gambling groups
and lobbyists.32
This Comment will examine the rather precarious legal
position of the daily fantasy sports industry in light of the
recent state trend of initially opposing and prohibiting daily
fantasy sports, and then subsequently passing legislation
that expressly legalizes the activity—but with heavy
regulations, consumer protection mechanisms, and state
revenue generating devices built in.33 The analysis will begin
in Part I of this Comment with a closer look at the origins of
fantasy sports in the United States, the development of daily
fantasy sports within that existing framework, and the
perceived legal “safe harbor” that helped inspire the idea for
daily fantasy sports, subsequently persuaded daily fantasy
investors, and paved the way for the meteoric rises of
FanDuel and DraftKings.
Part II of this Comment will discuss some of the

29. Van Natta, supra note 1.
30. S.B. 8153, 2015–16 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2016).
31. See id.
32. See Dustin Gouker, Anti-Gambling Group Leads Lawsuit Against New
York Daily Fantasy Sports Law, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11750/new-york-dfs-lawsuit/.
33. See, e.g., S.B. 8153.
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significant events and missteps that compelled the increased
legal scrutiny, eventually resulting in several states taking
legal action against, or expressing their opinion on the
illegality of, daily fantasy sports. Furthermore, this Part will
delve into the responsorial legislation passed in several
states, such as New York, as well as provide a closer look at
some of the more noteworthy aspects of such legislation and
its influence on the overall outlook for the daily fantasy
industry across America.
Finally, this Comment will conclude in Part III with a
discussion of how the legislative actions in a growing number
of states across the country, which clearly establish the
legality of daily fantasy sports at the state level can, and
should, serve as both a template and catalyst for the
increased liberalization of sports gambling policies
throughout the United States, at both the state and federal
levels, provided that the remaining legal impediments to
such liberalization are ultimately surmounted. Chief among
these impediments is the applicable federal prohibition on
state-sanctioned sports betting under the Professional and
Amateur
Sports
Protection
Act
(PASPA),
the
constitutionality of which is currently being challenged by
the State of New Jersey before the U.S. Supreme Court in
the case of Murphy v. NCAA. Both PASPA and New Jersey’s
Tenth Amendment challenge of the statute will be discussed,
at length, infra.
I. THE ADVENT OF DAILY FANTASY SPORTS IN AMERICA
This Part will briefly chronicle the development of
fantasy sports, in the United States, and discuss the origins
of daily fantasy sports, against this backdrop. This will
necessarily include taking a closer look at the existing
legislative and regulatory environment that the pioneers of
the daily fantasy industry sought entry into, and in fact
believed to be particularly conducive to both garnering initial
acceptance and promoting the longevity of their fantasy
products and services, from a legal standpoint.
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A. The Origins of Fantasy Sports
Today, fantasy sports are a cultural institution, firmly
entrenched in modern American society. In fact, in 2016,
roughly fifty-seven million Americans actively participated
in fantasy sports leagues.34 It was not always such a popular
activity, however, and the earliest forms of these contests
would likely be largely unrecognizable to a twenty-first
century fantasy sports aficionado.
The origins of fantasy sports can be traced all the way
back to 1941, when Ethan Allen, a former professional
baseball player, partnered with the Cadaco-Ellis game
company to devise a board game called “All-Star Baseball.”35
All-Star Baseball was the first successful attempt at
incorporating the on-field game performances of real-life
athletes into a game format.36 The game, in its original and
most basic conception, involved replicating a given player’s
past statistical performances on a round disk.37 Each disk
would then be divided into fourteen segments or “wedges,”
which were numbered one through fourteen, with each
number corresponding to a different possible outcome for a
given plate appearance.38 The wedges would then be
adjusted to reflect a player’s actual performance tendencies.
For instance, a home-run hitter would have a significantly
larger home-run wedge, as compared with a player who
typically hits mostly singles, and vice versa.39 The disks
would then be placed on a spinner, which would determine

34. Van Natta, supra note 1.
35. Ethan Allen, Cadaco-Ellis, and All-Star Baseball, BASEBALL GAMES,
http://baseballgames.dreamhosters.com/CadacoASB.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2017).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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the outcome of each “at-bat.”40 All-Star Baseball quickly
became immensely popular amongst baseball fans, and new
renditions of the game (updated to reflect changing player
rosters and statistical performances) would be produced
annually for fifty years thereafter.41
Later, in 1961, Hal Richman, a mathematics student at
Bucknell University, conceived of a more complex—but still
statistically oriented—recreational baseball game, which he
called “Strat-O-Matic Baseball.”42 Similar to All-Star
Baseball, Strat-O-Matic enabled participants to construct
lineups and simulate outcomes, relying on past player
statistical performances.43 The primary differences between
the two games were that Strat-O-Matic utilized more
complicated result tables and it also incorporated dice rolls,
as opposed to spins. Notwithstanding these relatively minor
differences, Strat-O-Matic baseball caught on quickly and
developed a fiercely loyal following, just as its predecessor
had over the prior two decades.44
The one major deficiency in both of these early renditions
of fantasy sports games was that neither game enabled
players to demonstrate their abilities to predict future
performances.45 Both Strat-O-Matic and All-Star Baseball
were exclusively reliant on past events and player
performances in order to model and estimate what would
probably occur. However, neither game model incorporated
what actually did occur at present or future times. In
response to this perceived deficiency, Bill Gamson, a
psychology professor at Harvard University and the

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How
America Regulates its National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 4–5
(2012).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 5.
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University of Michigan, devised a forward-looking baseball
game in the early 1960’s, which he referred to as “The
Baseball Seminar.”46 This was the first known simulation
game that bore a significant resemblance to the modern-day
manifestations of fantasy sports.47
Gamson’s “Baseball Seminar” required participants to
pay a ten-dollar entry fee, at which point they could draft a
roster of Major League Baseball players.48 The winner of the
Baseball Seminar—and presumably the pool of entry fee
money—was the participant whose roster of baseball players
performed the best in a pre-determined set of statistical
categories, over the course of the baseball season.49 The
Baseball Seminar was originally a relatively secretive
pastime, confined to Gamson’s inner circle of academic
friends and colleagues. However, in early 1965, one of the
original participants in the Baseball Seminar, a journalism
and film studies professor at the University of Michigan by
the name of Robert Sklar, passed the game along to one of
his mentees, Daniel Okrent.50
Nearly fifteen years later, in November of 1979, Daniel
Okrent gathered a group of his friends at a New York City
bistro, called “La Rotisserie Francaise,” to pitch to them the
idea of a fantasy baseball league.51 It was this meeting, and
more specifically its location, that inspired the term
“rotisserie baseball league,” which is still the term used
today to describe the most common format of season-long
fantasy baseball.52 In 1980, Okrent, Sklar, and nine of their
professional comrades held the inaugural auction draft for

46. Id. at 5–6.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6–7.
52. See id. at 7.
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their Rotisserie League.53 Each participant posted a $260
entry fee and used this money to bid on players in an auction
draft format.54 As per the original rules, these eleven
competitors could only select players from National League
rosters, and the winner was determined at the end of the
Major League Baseball Season, based on the statistical
performances of their respective rosters of players in eight
designated categories.55 The winner, whose roster earned the
most collective points over the course of the season, would
thereby win the pool of entry-fee cash and be ceremonially
doused in the chocolate drink “Yoo-Hoo” for his or her
efforts.56 These eleven fantasy trailblazers could not possibly
have known that what had begun as an engaging
recreational outlet, if not a bit of a joke amongst friends,
would eventually grow into a multi-billion dollar industry in
less than three decades.57
Since several of the original members in the Rotisserie
League were themselves media members, who in turn had
many acquaintances in the national media, it did not take
long for word to get out about this new activity.58 Before the
inaugural 1980 season was even completed, The New York
Times and the CBS Morning News had already run stories
on the Rotisserie League, even going so far as to chronicle the
biographies and individual performances of the eleven
competitors.59 The game quickly developed a cult-like
following,60 and new variations on the original rules were
introduced soon thereafter, including head-to-head formats

53. Id.; see also Josh Robbins, Geek Games: It’s Been 25 Years Since 11 Fans
Held First Rotisserie Auction, ORL. SENTINEL, Jun. 8, 2005, at D1.
54. Edelman, supra note 42, at 7.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7–8.
57. See id. at 8–11; see also Van Natta, supra note 1.
58. Edelman, supra note 42, at 8.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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of the game. A new moniker—“fantasy baseball”—was also
widely adopted.61 Today, nearly forty years after the
inaugural season, there are two primary versions of seasonlong fantasy baseball offered through major providers like
ESPN: head-to-head leagues and rotisserie leagues.62
In due time, the basic concept of Rotisserie League
Baseball was expanded into other “fantasy sports,” such as
football and basketball.63 By the early 1990’s, fantasy sports
started to gain steady traction as fantasy sports magazines,
season guides, radio shows, statistical services, management
groups, sportswear, and newsletters increasingly appeared
on the scene.64 Despite the escalating popularity, fantasy
sports were still viewed as primarily being “an activit[y] for
outcasts and engaged [in] by those presumed to be overly
bookish and socially challenged” at this point in time.65 Then,
in 1994, the entire landscape of fantasy sports in America
was forever changed with the advent of the Internet.66
The Internet not only facilitated immense growth for the
fantasy industry, but it also precipitated a rapid
demographic shift amongst fantasy participants.67 Fantasy
sports participation was no longer disproportionately
appealing to the statistically-minded, as the Internet
eliminated the need for individuals to tabulate statistics and
calculate results for themselves.68 Additionally, participants
were no longer in a position where their own participation
61. See id. at 8–9.
62. Scoring Formats, ESPN, http://games.espn.com/flb/resources/help/
content?name=scoring-formats (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (showing different
fantasy baseball scoring formats).
63. See Edelman, supra note 42, at 9 (stating that the core rules of the original
fantasy baseball games were later adopted and applied to fantasy games in other
sports).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id.
68. See id.
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depended on the respective interests of their close friends
and relatives. The Internet quite literally opened the door to
a whole world of potential fantasy competitors, regardless of
geographical proximity or prior relationships.69 Companies
such as ESPN quickly took advantage of the wealth of new
possibilities, and by 1995, it introduced its first Internetbased fantasy game.70 By 2000, ESPN offered fantasy
contests in a wide range of sports beyond baseball including
football, basketball, hockey, NASCAR, soccer, golf, and fly
fishing.71 As of 2009, season-long fantasy sports was already
a five-billion-dollar industry.72
B. Daily Fantasy Sports Enter the Market
On October 13, 2006, President George W. Bush
inadvertently and indirectly launched the daily fantasy
sports industry when he signed the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) into law.73 The law was
aimed at eradicating illegal online poker and sports betting
operations, and it was groundbreaking in the sense that it
was the first time that Internet payment processors would
be held liable for their role in facilitating illegal online
gambling.74 The logic was simple: if online gambling
operations could not collect user fees, then their services
could effectively be rendered obsolete. To this end, the law
was largely successful, as many of the more prominent
sportsbooks and online poker outfits voluntarily left the U.S.
marketplace, which consequently made the task of isolating
and prosecuting the remaining illegal gambling operations
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 10–11.
72. See id. at 11.
73. See Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports:
A Detailed Primer in Federal and State Gambling Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117,
122–23 (2016); Van Natta, supra note 1.
74. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 122–23.
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for their many violations of federal and state law a much
simpler task.75
There were other unintended consequences stemming
from the passage of UIGEA, however. For instance, when all
of the online sportsbooks and poker enterprises suddenly left
the U.S. market, they left behind a void, as consumer
demand for such products did not exit the market.76 This was
likely not surprising to lawmakers; yet, what they could not
possibly have realized at the time was that UIGEA, the very
law that had driven illegal online gambling from the United
States and thereby created this void, had also
simultaneously provided the legal gray area that ultimately
inspired and facilitated the reincarnation of online sports
gambling in its newest form: daily fantasy sports.77 For, at
the behest of the fantasy sports industry, and the
professional sports leagues themselves, a carve-out was
made in UIGEA to allow for the incredibly popular seasonlong fantasy sports leagues to continue to legally operate in
the United States.78 The law was completely silent on daily
fantasy sports, as they had not yet been invented at this
time. In fact, as will be discussed at length infra, it was this
very same legal carve-out that would eventually provide a
“safe harbor” for the leading daily fantasy sports enterprises
to gain an initial foothold, and to subsequently grow their
operations exponentially over the course of several years.79
Daily fantasy operations, as we know them today, are
relatively standard in their formats, particularly amongst
the two industry giants, FanDuel and DraftKings. On both
sites, users are provided with a “salary cap,” which is
effectively their budget for selecting players, and then tasked
with the challenge of constructing a lineup of real-life
75. See id.
76. See id. at 124.
77. See id. at 143; see also Van Natta, supra note 1.
78. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 143; Van Natta, supra note 1.
79. Van Natta, supra note 1.

2018]

FANTASY SPORTS

731

players—each having previously been assigned a “salary” by
the respective site—under the limitations of the
aforementioned salary cap.80 Players can then pay entry fees
ranging from a single dollar all the way up to $10,600 in
order to enter these lineups into a variety of different
contests, including one-on-one matchups, fifty-fifty contests
(where the top-scoring fifty percent of players win cash
prizes), and tournaments featuring hundreds of thousands of
competitors and cash prizes that oftentimes reach seven
figure dollar amounts.81 However, the first companies
branding themselves as “daily fantasy sports” operations
that entered the market in the wake of UIGEA really did not
resemble daily fantasy sports as we know them today.82
These companies, such as Fantasy Day Sports Corp., were
primarily just sportsbooks couching themselves as fantasy
games.83 Yet, as Fantasy Day Sports Corp. and similar
entities inexplicably got away with their continued
operation, other variations began to pop up, some of which
more closely resembled the products that the legions of daily
fantasy participants are accustomed to today.84 Beginning in
2008, companies such as Snapdraft, Fantasy Factor,
Fantazzle, FanDuel, DraftStreet, DraftDay, and DraftKings
appeared on the daily fantasy scene.85 But, eventually,
FanDuel and DraftKings emerged to establish their market
dominance.
FanDuel originated in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 2008, as
“HubDub,” a web-based prediction market site that allowed
users to bet virtual money on the outcome of significant

80. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 127.
81. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction at 3–4, 13–14, 19, People v. FanDuel, Inc., (No. 453056/15), 2015 WL
9273711 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 17, 2015).
82. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 124.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 125.
85. Id.
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events, such as the 2008 U.S. presidential election.86
According to Nigel Eccles, the founder and CEO of FanDuel,
HubDub actually proved to be very popular and engaging.
However, it had one major flaw—it was not conducive to
generating revenue in its original format.87 Recognizing that
sports was one of the most popular categories on HubDub,
and realizing the need to incorporate real money into the
existing business model, Eccles looked across the Atlantic at
the booming fantasy sports industry in the United States and
saw room for improvement.88 Specifically, Eccles believed
that there were two significant deficiencies in the existing
season-long renditions of fantasy sports in America: they
were not particularly mobile-friendly in an era where people
increasingly owned smartphones, and, perhaps most
notably, they were not nearly fast-paced enough for a
millennial generation that seemed to have an affinity for
instant gratification.89 Additionally, it was evident to the
founders of FanDuel, some of whom were veterans of the
online poker industry, that the passage of UIGEA had left a
void in the U.S. marketplace, and they were enticed by the
untapped potential that existed for a fantasy sports product
that bore many of the same characteristics of a traditional
online gambling operation.90 Finally, after diligently
reviewing the text of UIGEA, Eccles concluded that his newly
conceived daily fantasy sports product would enjoy “safe
harbor” under the new law, and FanDuel was launched.91
As FanDuel began to grow, the three men who
eventually founded DraftKings, Jason Robins, Matt Kalish,
86. Paul Sawers, How FanDuel Grew from Humble Scottish Startup into an
American Fantasy Sports Giant, VENTUREBEAT (May 22, 2016, 10:38 AM),
https://venturebeat.com/2016/05/22/how-fanduel-grew-from-humble-scottish-sta
rtup-into-an-american-fantasy-sports-giant/.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Van Natta, supra note 1.
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and Paul Liberman, were all still working at the printing
company, Vistaprint, near Boston, Massachusetts.92 In
January 2011, Kalish first proposed to Robins the idea of
taking the basic premise of season-long fantasy sports, and
condensing it into a single day of action.93 Mere days later,
undeterred by the discovery that FanDuel was already
gaining a good amount of traction in the market, the three
men set to work.94 By November 2011, the young CEO
Robins was able to secure his first investor, Ryan Moore.95
Although Moore invested one million dollars in the fledgling
company, the three co-founders still struggled to gain more
investors, and the capital that they desperately needed.96
Finally, Moore challenged the young men to quit their jobs
at Vistaprint and fully invest in the company themselves if
they wanted to convince others to do the same. They did so
and quickly attracted more investors.97 On April 27, 2012,
DraftKings hosted its inaugural fantasy contest,98 and,
within three short years, they were vying with FanDuel for
industry supremacy.99
C. The Legality of Daily Fantasy Sports in the United
States
From its inception, the legal position of daily fantasy
sports in the United States has always been rather tenuous,
at both the state and federal levels. This Section provides a
look at the relevant federal laws as well as the three distinct
state approaches to determining the legality of fantasy

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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sports. In considering these state and federal statutes, there
are two important considerations to bear in mind. The first
of these is quite simple: the definition of the word “gamble.”
The two primary definitions provided for “gamble” in the
Merriam-Webster dictionary are: “to play a game for money
or property” and “to bet on an uncertain outcome.”100 The
second important consideration to keep in mind is the basic
business models of fantasy sports. Players pay “entry fees” to
fantasy sports contests, which generally begin and end
within a single day’s time, and the players who score the
highest will win real money, based on how high they finish
and the contest format.101 Meanwhile, similar to an online
poker venture, the daily fantasy companies derive their
profits from taking a percentage “rake” or “vig” from the total
entry fees collected for a given contest.102 With these factual
considerations in mind, it is time to juxtapose them with an
examination of the existing legal framework at the time of
the daily fantasy industry’s inception.
1. Federal Laws Pertaining to Fantasy Sports
There are four federal laws that are currently relevant
to the legality of the daily fantasy sports industry: the
Interstate Wire Act of 1964 (Wire Act), the Illegal Gambling
Business Act of 1970 (Gambling Act), the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), and the
aforementioned Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act (UIGEA).103 To date, no legal action has been taken
against the daily fantasy sports industry on the basis of these
federal laws; however, a closer examination of the text of

100. Gamble, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/gamble (last updated Apr. 8, 2018).
101. See generally Shoshanna Delventhal, How FanDuel and DraftKings Work,
INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 24, 2015, 10:40 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/investing/122415/how-fanduel-and-draftkings-work.asp (explaining the
general business model for FanDuel and DraftKings).
102. See Van Natta, supra note 1.
103. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 136–44.
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these laws demonstrates that companies like FanDuel and
DraftKings are not exactly in a comfortable legal position at
the federal level either.104 Significantly, these are federal
laws, and thus individuals or entities that engage in illegal
gambling, as defined by state or local laws, still may be
subject to federal prosecution.105
The first of these federal laws, the Wire Act, was passed
in 1964 and prohibits individuals and entities from engaging
in gambling activities through the knowing use of “a wire
communication facility for the transmission in interstate or
foreign commerce . . . .”106 The law was initially designed to
inhibit the abilities of organized crime gambling rings by
preventing criminals from obtaining the results of horse
races via telegraph communications.107 Notably, Internet
communications have subsequently been deemed within the
scope of the Wire Act, in both state108 and federal courts.109
Therefore, in light of these decisions, daily fantasy
companies that function exclusively via the Internet, and
continuously cross state lines in so doing, are most likely in
constant violation of the Wire Act if they are in fact gambling
operations.
Similarly, under the federal Gambling Act, anyone who
“conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all
or part of an illegal gambling business” could face hefty fines
and up to five years in prison.110 Any potential illegality will

104. See id.
105. See id. at 135–36.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012); id. at 136.
107. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 136.
108. See, e.g., Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 185 Misc.2d 852, 860
(N.Y. Sup. 1999) (applying the Wire Act in a case where betting instructions were
transmitted via the Internet).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 716 (1st Cir. 2014)
(acknowledging the “Wire Act’s evident applicability to the internet.”).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2012); Edelman, supra note 73, at 138.

736

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

again likely come down to the laws of a given state.111 The
three primary approaches to defining what constitutes illegal
gambling at the state level will be discussed, at length, infra.
In 1992, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act was signed into law, largely at the behest of the four
major professional sports leagues in the United States—the
NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB—in addition to the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).112 These leagues
wanted to discourage both private and state-sponsored
sports gambling in an effort to both reaffirm and maintain
the integrity of their collective leagues and minimize the
potential for unscrupulous or dishonest behavior to influence
the outcome of sporting events.113 In relevant part, PASPA
prohibits any person or state from conducting “a lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme
based, directly or indirectly . . . on one or more competitive
games in which amateur or professional athletes
participate . . . .”114 Importantly, this law also grants
automatic standing for any of these five athletic leagues to
directly bring suit against any person or entity deemed to be
in violation of this law; in doing so, it also prohibits any state
from legalizing certain forms of sports gambling.115 For this
reason, only four states have any form of legalized sports
betting today: Delaware, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon.116
All four of these states had already legalized sports betting
at the time PASPA was signed into law, and even they had
to vigorously fight to be grandfathered in under the new
law.117

111. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 138.
112. See id. at 139–40.
113. See id.
114. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704
(2012); id.
115. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 140.
116. See id.
117. See id.
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Therefore, the legality of daily fantasy sports at the
federal level, at least with respect to PASPA, is primarily
dependent on the whims of the professional sports leagues
and their management and ownership, since the leagues
hold much of the prosecutorial power.118 As such, it is no
surprise that both FanDuel and DraftKings have actively
sought, and received, the endorsements of several of these
professional sports leagues, including a couple of high-profile
NFL franchise owners, such as Jerry Jones and Robert
Kraft.119 With this in mind, FanDuel and DraftKings do not
appear to be in any immediate jeopardy under PASPA, since
it would be counterintuitive for the major professional
leagues and owners to simultaneously invest in, and bring
suit against, these daily fantasy sports enterprises.
The fourth pertinent federal law, and the one that
FanDuel and DraftKings ostensibly tailored their respective
business models to exude a perceived conformity with, is the
aforementioned Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act of 2006. While UIGEA has been largely successful in
eradicating online poker operations and sportsbooks, it
contains a carve-out for season-long fantasy sports, and it
was this carve-out that would become critically important to
Nigel Eccles and Jason Robins as they launched their
fledgling daily fantasy sports enterprises.120 This carve-out
provides safe harbor to “any fantasy or simulation sports
game . . . or contest,” as long as three additional criteria are
met: (1) any prizes and awards offered must be established
prior to the commencement of the contest and cannot be
solely dependent on the number of competitors or the total
amount of fees paid by competitors; (2) the outcome of the
contests must be reflective of the relative knowledge and
skill of the competitors and must be based predominantly on
the statistical performances of real-life athletes in multiple

118. Id. at 141.
119. See id. at 127; Van Natta, supra note 1.
120. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 143; Van Natta, supra note 1.
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real-world sporting events; and (3) no winning outcome can
be based solely on the performance of any single real-world
team or the performance of a single real-world athlete in any
event.121
It was primarily this set of criteria that encouraged
Eccles to design FanDuel so that the site (1) offers predetermined prizes and guaranteed prize pools, (2) most often
rewards the most skilled and experienced participants, and
(3) limits the number of players from a single real-world
team that a participant can utilize in a given FanDuel
lineup.122 DraftKings subscribes to largely the same business
model, however it has been known to push the legal envelope
by offering contests in individual sports such as golf and
NASCAR, which raises the question as to whether it violated
UIGEA’s requirement that winning outcomes be based on
multiple real-world events.123
2. State Approaches to Fantasy Sports Legality
As discussed above, state laws have a significant bearing
on fantasy sports legality, not only in each individual state,
but also on the federal legal status of daily fantasy sports.
With that in mind, it is important to understand the three
distinct state level approaches to analyzing whether or not
daily fantasy sports constitutes illegal gambling in a given
state.
Generally speaking, a prima facie claim of illegal
gambling can only be established at the state level when

121. See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–
5366 (2012); Edelman, supra note 73, at 143.
122. See generally Van Natta, supra note 1 (discussing Eccles’ initial studies of
UIGEA, his conclusion that the law would provide “safe harbor” for his model of
fantasy sports and branding daily fantasy as a game of skill in which higher skill
levels purportedly translate into better results).
123. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 143; id. But cf. Dustin Gouker, FanDuel
is Joining DraftKings with a Daily Fantasy Golf Offering, LEGAL SPORTS REP.
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/12695/fanduel-fantasy-golf/
(indicating that FanDuel has very recently entered the daily fantasy golf market).
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three elements are present: consideration, reward, and
chance.124 Since daily fantasy sports contests indisputably
meet the elements of consideration and reward, the legal
question primarily centers on the element of chance.125 This
is the reason that FanDuel and DraftKings have historically
gone to great lengths to brand their products as “games of
skill,” for a game based on “skill” is legal, whereas a game
based on “chance” may or may not be, depending on a state’s
individual approach.126 The requisite skill-to-chance ratio,
which is so pivotal in determining the legality of this entire
industry, varies between states; however, there are three
primary approaches to this centrally important issue.127
These three approaches are: the “predominant purpose test,”
the “material element test,” and the “modicum of chance”
standard.128
The majority approach amongst states is to employ the
“predominant purpose test,” which is an analysis of whether
a contest involves more skill than chance.129 Put simply, if
the contest is deemed to be based more on skill (or
knowledge), than it is on chance, then the contest is legal in
a state employing the predominant purpose test. Conversely,
if the game were determined to be predominantly chancebased, then the contest would be considered illegal gambling
(having also satisfied the consideration and reward
elements). Daily fantasy sports certainly involve notable
elements of chance, including both “imperfect information”
chance (manifesting itself in the unpredictability of player
injuries, weather conditions, game cancellations, etc.) and
“lucky shot” chance (which occurs when a relatively
inexperienced and less knowledgeable player simply gets

124. Edelman, supra note 73, at 30.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 130–35.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 130.
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lucky and selects players that perform unexpectedly well).130
On the other hand, since player performance can be largely
dependent on more predictable analytical considerations,
such as past statistical performance, team matchups, and
past player usage rates, there is a degree of knowledge and
skill that can be somewhat determinative in daily fantasy
contests. Some courts have ostensibly acknowledged the
presence of skill in fantasy games, too.131 Therefore, it is
largely unclear how a given state court will interpret daily
fantasy sports under the predominant purpose test, but the
analysis would certainly have to be a fact intensive exercise,
as some scholars have noted.132
A stricter approach to the question of daily fantasy
sports legality, taken in a minority of states, involves
analyzing whether or not chance is a “material element” in a
given contest.133 This “material element test,” employed in
states like Missouri and New York, does not require that
chance be the dominant or majority determinant in a contest;
it merely requires a “material” degree of significance, with
respect to determining the outcome of such contests.134 It is
therefore possible for skill to be the predominant factor in a
contest, yet still have that contest deemed illegal under the
material element test.135
The third state approach in determining what
constitutes a game of chance is the “modicum of chance”
standard.136 This standard, used by states like Arizona,
Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, and Tennessee, outlaws games

130. See id. at 131–32.
131. See Humphrey v. Viacom, No. 06-2768(DMC), 2007 WL 1797648, at *2–6
(D.N.J. June 20, 2007).
132. Edelman, supra note 73, at 132.
133. Id. at 134.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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that feature “even a modicum of chance.”137 Therefore, in the
absence of specific legislation to the contrary, daily fantasy
sports are patently illegal in all of these states, since it is
incontrovertible that daily fantasy involves at least some
degree of chance.
Finally, there are two outlier states, Hawaii and
Montana, that take distinctly unique approaches.138
Montana has a blanket prohibition on all forms of
commercial online gambling, thereby maintaining a
monopoly on gambling within the state,139 whereas Hawaii
prohibits contests that “encourage a gambling instinct.”140
FanDuel and DraftKings recognized the problematic climate
in Montana from the outset of their enterprises, and
subsequently never operated within the state; furthermore,
the leading daily fantasy providers both ceased operations in
Hawaii, following an unfavorable opinion issued by the state
Attorney General, Doug Chin, which concluded that daily
fantasy sports did in fact constitute illegal gambling under
state law.141
II. STATE RESPONSES TO THE DAILY FANTASY SPORTS
INDUSTRY
For a number of years, the daily fantasy industry was
able to operate relatively inconspicuously; however, that
began to change as FanDuel and DraftKings grew and
garnered increasing national attention. Some of this
attention was negative, and much of it can be directly

137. See id. at 134–35.
138. Id. at 135.
139. Dustin Gouker, Will All 50 States Allow Daily Fantasy Sports ‘Very Soon’?
No
Chance
in
Hell,
LEGAL SPORTS REP.,
(Jan.
17,
2017),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/13285/50-states-fantasy-sports/.
140. Edelman, supra note 73, at 135.
141. See id. at 144; Ryan Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy Sports State-by-State
Tracker, ABC NEWS (June 19, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/daily-fantasysports-state-state-tracker/story?id=48138210.
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attributed to lapses in judgment on the part of management
at the two companies, the increased confidence that
oftentimes accompanies success, and perhaps even a false
sense of legal security.142 Irrespective of the exact causes, the
resulting consequences are undisputed: one by one, states
began to challenge the legality of daily fantasy sports, and
they did so in a very public and damaging way.143
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman led this
charge, and although New York’s prohibition on daily
fantasy sports was relatively short-lived, Schneiderman set
the template for challenging the legality of daily fantasy
sports, and thereby paved the way for other states to do the
same.144 But New York was also instrumental in establishing
another important precedent pertaining to daily fantasy
sports: by passing legislation that both legalized and
regulated daily fantasy contests in New York, the state
effectively saved the daily fantasy sports industry, while
introducing much-needed consumer safeguards.145 These
initial hard-won legislative affirmations afforded the daily
fantasy leaders an opportunity to recover, and while they
still face a multitude of legal hurdles in states across the
country, there is a growing momentum for states to legalize
and regulate the activity.
A. How the Daily Fantasy Sports Industry Attracted
Increased Scrutiny
As of 2013, having already experienced rampant growth,
FanDuel and DraftKings were poised to take their
operations to another level altogether. On December 8, 2013,
FanDuel crowned the first-ever one-day fantasy sports
millionaire, a sales manager from Sioux City, Iowa, named

142. See Van Natta, supra note 1.
143. See Gouker, supra note 139; Olanoff, supra note 17; Stutz, supra note 22.
144. Rodenberg, supra note 141.
145. S.B. 8153, 2015–16 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2016).
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Travis Spieth.146 Spieth had turned a mere ten dollars into
one million dollars in the FanDuel Fantasy Football
Championship.147 A year later, Scott Hansen, a personal
trainer from Pasadena, California, became the first one-day
multi-millionaire, having taken home two million dollars in
the very same contest.148 The fact that the first place prize
money had quite literally doubled in a year’s time can be
accurately viewed as a microcosm of the growth experienced
in the industry as a whole. In 2011, daily fantasy entry fees
totaled $20 million; by 2014, annual entry fees had hit $1
billion.149
By the end of 2014, DraftKings had clearly established
itself as FanDuel’s prime competitor, a move that was
solidified when DraftKings purchased the third-largest daily
fantasy site, DraftStreet, earlier that summer. 150
Meanwhile, perhaps motivated by concerns stemming from
their precarious legal positions under PASPA, the two
companies moved quickly to solidify the approval of the
professional sports leagues. After all, in March 2013, the
chief executive of Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
Robert Bowman, publicly stated that he viewed daily fantasy
sports contests as “akin to a flip of the coin, which is the
definition of gambling.”151 Yet, by the end of 2014, Major
League Baseball and the National Hockey League had
advertising partnerships and investments with DraftKings,
whereas the National Basketball Association had
established an exclusive partnership, in exchange for an
equity stake, with FanDuel.152 These leagues were largely
enamored with the role the daily fantasy sites were playing
146. Van Natta, supra note 1.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Edelman, supra note 73, at 117.
152. See id.; Van Natta, supra note 1.
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in boosting their respective television ratings.153
As all of this growth was occurring, the Fantasy Sports
Trade Association’s president, Paul Charchian, strongly
urged the two industry leaders to tread lightly.154 At a
meeting in January 2013, he advised the companies to
deemphasize the monetary aspects of their contests, remove
all gambling-related language from their websites, and
refrain from marketing the notion that daily fantasy
participants could potentially win big money.155 In fact, Nigel
Eccles echoed this sentiment himself in an April 2014 betterbusiness consumer protection charter that he drafted.156 But,
ultimately, the two companies simply could not resist.
The Fantasy Sports Trade Association had also strongly
recommended that the companies proactively campaign in
states and work with lawmakers to establish the legality of
their enterprises.157 The establishment of a self-regulatory
board, which would monitor customer complaints and
maintain the integrity and transparency of daily fantasy
contests, was also suggested.158 However, both of the
aforementioned recommendations were mostly dismissed by
the companies, as they deemed them to be unnecessary and
expensive endeavors.159
The calls for a regulatory board were largely in response
to complaints from everyday players who cited predatory
tactics by the big-money, high-volume players colloquially
referred to as “sharks.”160 Approximately fifty of these highvolume sharks wager at least $1 million each year on

153. See Van Natta, supra note 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
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FanDuel and DraftKings; they have been known to enter
upwards of one hundred lineups in a single, big-money
contest.161 Aside from sheer volume, another frequent tactic
of sharks is to use a computerized script (oftentimes
undetectable to the sites) to target inexperienced players in
the site’s “lobbies,” as the scripts enable them to
instantaneously crunch performance data and seek out
competitors that give them a better chance of victory.162
Other scripts have been employed to enable participants to
make last-second changes to multiple lineups at once.163 The
sites always policed this behavior, sometimes even
suspending players, but they never did so with the
regulatory teeth or vigor that they could have.164 After all,
sixty percent of all revenue in the daily fantasy industry was
estimated to come from the roughly 15,000 high-volume
players who wagered at least $10,000 annually.165 Yet, this
should have been immensely alarming to FanDuel and
DraftKings because it threatened the very foundation of
their industry’s legality: the idea that daily fantasy sports
were in fact “games of skill.” As one former FanDuel
consultant, John Sullivan, put it: “It’s only a skill game if you
have the biggest bankroll and the best technology . . . [t]hat’s
the dirty little secret.”166
Instead, entering the 2015 NFL season, the two industry
leaders primarily focused on their escalating marketing
arms race, as they vied for a larger portion of the fifty-seven
million Americans who played fantasy sports, attempting to
lure them away from the season-long format with the
enticing selling points of fast-paced action, thrilling
competition, instant gratification, and, most prominently,

161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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immensely lucrative paydays.167 Having just consummated
funding rounds of $275 million and $300 million,
respectively, FanDuel and DraftKings prepared to levy a
marketing onslaught.168
Following the 2014 NFL season, in which FanDuel spent
more money on advertising than DraftKings did, DraftKings
pledged to never be outspent by their rival again, and they
delivered on this promise.169 During the first week of
September 2015, DraftKings actually spent more money on
advertising than any other U.S. company, with an incredible
$24,067,328 spent on 6,749 national commercial airings, over
the course of seven days.170 To put this in perspective, in the
weeks leading up to the 2015 NFL season, the two companies
spent more on advertising than the entire U.S. beer industry
combined.171 By year’s end, the two companies had sunk
$750 million into advertising; at one point, a FanDuel or
DraftKings commercial was appearing onscreen every ninety
seconds, on average.172 FanDuel had initially planned to
scale-back its advertising expenditures in 2015, likely
sensing that it might be a good time to keep a lower profile;
however, after DraftKings surpassed them over the summer
by establishing sixty percent of the market share, FanDuel
reversed course and tried to keep pace with DraftKings.173
As if the exorbitant television spending was not already
sufficient, the two companies also struck deals for
advertising and signage with entities like the Walt Disney
Corporation (the parent company of both ABC and ESPN)

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Dustin Gouker, King of Commercials: DraftKings Rises to No. 1 in TV
Spending with $24 Million This Week, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Sept. 7, 2015),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/3611/draftkings-no-1-in-tv-commercials/.
171. Van Natta, supra note 1.
172. Id.
173. Id.

2018]

FANTASY SPORTS

747

and in professional sports stadiums and arenas, across the
country.174 By September 2015, the Wall Street Journal
estimated FanDuel and DraftKings to be worth $1.3 billion
and $1.2 billion, respectively.175
Then, on October 5, 2015, scandal struck when The New
York Times broke the story of Ethan Haskell, a DraftKings
employee who had allegedly used inside information to win
$350,000 in a FanDuel NFL contest.176 As soon as the story
came off the press, irreversible damage was done, as Haskell
had apparently utilized protected player usage data—a
statistic that would likely remain relatively consistent
between the two sites—in order to choose his winning lineup
on FanDuel.177 Part of what makes succeeding in daily
fantasy sports challenging is the fact that it is not enough to
merely select the best players, because the salary cap largely
prevents this, and even if it did not, it is intuitively not
beneficial to only select players that the majority of other
competitors have also selected. Therefore, it is strategically
vital to pick a few cheaper, less-utilized players, whom most
other people have not selected, because if and when those
players have good statistical outputs, a participant has
thereby gained a large advantage over the rest of the field.
Therefore, the accusations against Haskell were gravely
concerning to the daily fantasy industry leaders, both of
whom already forbade their employees from playing on their
employers’ sites, and discouraged high-profile participation
on their competitors’ sites, because it was the kind of incident
that would attract intense regulatory and legal scrutiny;
and, the very next day, it did.178

174. Schrotenboer, supra note 6; id.
175. Tuttle, supra note 2.
176. Van Natta, supra note 1.
177. See id.
178. Id.
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B. New York State’s Response
The morning after The New York Times story broke, New
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman called a two-hour
meeting to analyze the situation and consider the State’s
legal response.179 While The New York Times article was the
impetus for the meeting, the topic of conversation quickly
turned to the barrage of advertisements, which promised
instant wealth.180 As Kathleen McGee, Chief of the Bureau
of Internet & Technology of the New York Attorney General’s
Office put it, “Their ads are everywhere . . . You couldn’t
escape them.”181
Word of Schneiderman’s investigation soon leaked, and
by October 6, 2015, companies like ESPN began removing
the companies’ advertising elements from their
broadcasts.182 Less than two weeks later, on October 16,
Nevada became the first state to prohibit FanDuel and
DraftKings from continuing to operate within the state.183
This move, however, was primarily motivated by Nevada’s
desire to protect its domestic gaming industry; in fact, daily
fantasy sports are patently legal in Nevada, provided that
operators first obtain a license, which neither FanDuel nor
DraftKings bothered to do.184 Finally, on November 10,
Schneiderman sent individual letters to FanDuel and
DraftKings, ordering both companies to cease and desist
operations in New York.185 This was a huge blow to the two
companies, particularly so for FanDuel, which was
headquartered in New York City, and had also recently
struck marketing deals with two of the NFL franchises

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Duara, supra note 21.
184. See id.
185. See Bogdanich, supra note 17; id.; Olanoff, supra note 17.
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affiliated with the State, in the Buffalo Bills and the New
York Jets.186 In a powerful press release that day,
Schneiderman stated: “It is clear that DraftKings and
FanDuel are the leaders of a massive, multibillion-dollar
scheme intended to evade the law and fleece sports fans
across the country. Today we have sent a clear message: not
in New York, and not on my watch.”187
One week later, Schneiderman filed a scathing
memorandum of law in support of the preliminary injunction
he was seeking against the two companies.188 In this
memorandum, Schneiderman began by applying the
relevant New York standard: the “material element test.” 189
In proffering his conclusion that daily fantasy did in fact
depend significantly on chance, he cited the fact that such
random occurrences as player injuries, bad bounces, and
weather events could “irrevocably alter the outcome of a
[daily fantasy contest].”190 But Schneiderman was only
getting warmed up.
New York’s Attorney General then took the two industry
leaders to task for providing a “plainly illegal” product that
was “nothing more than a rebranding of sports betting.”191
He then targeted the companies’ excessive advertising
campaigns for misleading people into truly believing that the
fantasy contests were merely “games of skill,” in saying “no
bettor—no matter how shrewd or sophisticated—can control
or influence whether . . . athletes will succeed.”192 Notably,
Schneiderman also seemed to take issue with the very
practice that the Fantasy Sports Trade Association, and
Nigel Eccles, had cautioned the fledgling industry against, in
186. Schrotenboer, supra note 6.
187. Olanoff, supra note 17.
188. See People v. FanDuel Motion, supra note 19.
189. See id. at 2.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1.
192. Id.
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observing that the companies’ “unrelenting barrage of
advertisements that depict FanDuel and DraftKings as a
new form of lottery,” and that the companies lured
unsuspecting people into predatory gambling operations
through their advertised depictions of “cash falling from the
ceiling,” “oversized novelty checks,” and promises of “lifechanging piles of cash.”193
However, in New York, the prohibition was relatively
short-lived; on August 3, 2016, New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo signed “An Act to Amend the Racing, Pari-Mutuel
Wagering and Breeding Law, in Relation to the Registration
and Regulation of Interactive Fantasy Sports Contests” into
law, thereby declaring daily fantasy contests legal “games of
skill.”194
Importantly, the legislation contained several key
regulatory elements, as well as financial incentives for other
states to take similar legislative action, with respect to the
daily fantasy industry. First and foremost, the new law
requires operators to register with the state once every three
years, and in so doing, enhances transparency by requiring
that registered operators agree to periodic audits of their
books and records.195 Additionally, a series of procedural
safeguards were introduced, including: limiting players to
one active account with a site, prohibiting participants under
the age of eighteen, requiring that advertisements accurately
represent the odds of winning, limiting a player’s allotted
number of entries into a given contest, and introducing
information and assistance for compulsive gambling.196
Moreover, the law features revenue-generating aspects,
including a fifteen percent tax on gross revenue, along with
an additional secondary tax that is not to exceed $50,000 per

193. Id. at 2–3.
194. See S.B. 8153, 2015–16 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2016).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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year.197 The tax is estimated to generate at least $4 million
in annual state revenue,198 all of which is slated to go directly
toward education funding.199
Somewhat surprisingly, Schneiderman reversed course,
and defended the new law asserting the legality of daily
fantasy sports.200 This complete change of opinion garnered
negative attention from anti-gambling organizations,201 but
Schneiderman was not ready to completely absolve the
industry he had previously staunchly opposed, as he opted to
maintain his false advertising suit against FanDuel and
DraftKings, a suit that has subsequently been settled, with
both companies agreeing to pay $6 million in damages.202
C. Other States Follow New York’s Lead
In the wake of the prohibitions in New York and Nevada,
seven other states followed suit,203 and several of these
states’ attorneys generals even went so far as to directly cite
New York’s actions in the matter.204 Within months,
Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, Tennessee,
and Texas similarly forced FanDuel and DraftKings to cease

197. Id.
198. Tom Precious, Daily Fantasy Sports Now Legal in New York State,
BUFFALO NEWS (Aug. 3, 2016), http://buffalonews.com/2016/08/03/daily-fantasysports-now-legal-in-new-york-state/.
199. S.B. 8153, 2015–16 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2016); id.
200. See Gouker, supra note 32.
201. See id.
202. Dustin Gouker, DraftKings, FanDuel Pay $6 Million Each to Settle New
York Daily Fantasy Sports Case, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/11901/draftkings-fanduel-pay-6-million-innew-york-case/.
203. Stutz, supra note 22.
204. Dustin Gouker, If DraftKings and FanDuel Settle False Advertising
Claims In New York, Could Other States Follow Suit?, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Oct.
24, 2016), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/11887/draftkings-fanduel-settle
ment-new-york/.
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and desist operations in their states.205 Other states, such as
Illinois, have issued negative opinions on the legality of daily
fantasy sports, but have nonetheless permitted operations to
continue.206 In that sense, it is fair to credit Schneiderman,
and New York, with setting a precedent for examining the
legality of daily fantasy, and also, perhaps more importantly,
for providing the impetus for the daily fantasy industry to
actively seek legal clarification and initiate dialogue with
legislators, in states across the country.
In March 2016, Virginia became the first state to
unequivocally assert the legality of daily fantasy sports,
while simultaneously regulating the industry, when
Governor Terry McCauliffe signed “The Fantasy Contests
Act” into law.207 Within four months, five additional states—
Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, and
Tennessee—introduced legislation of their own, thereby
declaring daily fantasy sports legal, and subjecting them to
state regulation.208 Interestingly, the majority of these states
all seemed to recognize the value in daily fantasy as a means
to generate revenue within their respective states.209 To
date, state legislatures have expressly legalized daily
fantasy sports in seventeen states, with Arkansas, Delaware,
Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont also joining the
ranks.210
205. See Gouker, supra note 139.
206. See id.
207. Fitz Tepper, Virginia’s Governor Just Signed the Nation’s First Daily
Fantasy Sports Law, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 7, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/
03/07/virginias-governor-just-signed-the-nations-first-daily-fantasy-sports-law/.
208. Marvin A. Kirsner, States Looking at Legalized Fantasy Sports as Revenue
Source, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
states-looking-legalized-fantasy-sports-revenue-source.
209. Id.
210. See Gouker, supra note 139; Dustin Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Daily
Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP., http://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-billtracker/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2018) [hereinafter Gouker, Legislative Tracker:
Daily Fantasy Sports]; see also Rodenberg, supra note 141.
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While sports law experts disagree over how expeditiously
it will occur,211 it is difficult to deny the growing momentum
for legalizing, regulating, and taxing daily fantasy sports in
states around the country. As of the time of this writing,
there are twelve additional states where legislation to
legalize daily fantasy is pending: Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Michigan, Nebraska, Washington, and Wisconsin.212
Particularly noteworthy among these, are a pair of “modicum
of chance” states, Iowa and Washington, as well as Hawaii,
a state where gambling has traditionally been prohibited. On
the other hand, the introduction of legislation is only the first
step in the process, so the daily fantasy industry is not yet in
a comfortable position. In states like Alabama, Arizona,
California, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas, and West Virginia, legislative efforts have been
introduced, but ultimately were stopped short of being
signed into law.213
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DAILY FANTASY SPORTS
CONTROVERSY ON SPORTS BETTING POLICIES IN THE UNITED
STATES
The brief, yet rather tumultuous, history of the daily
fantasy sports industry’s early years, complete with the legal
challenges advanced in states like New York, the ultimate
legislative successes in several of these states, and the
growing momentum for similar legal validation in additional
states, is likely illustrative of both the present status, and
future direction, of sports gambling policy in the United
States. The trials and tribulations of the daily fantasy sports
industry, and its hard-earned triumphs in several states,
are, in all likelihood, a microcosm for the imminent
211. See Gouker, supra note 139.
212. Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Daily Fantasy Sports, supra note 210.
213. See id.
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liberalization of sports betting in America. At the present
time, the State of New Jersey is actively challenging the
constitutionality of the aforementioned Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), before the U.S.
Supreme Court.214 PASPA is the piece of legislation
responsible for twice stymieing the New Jersey legislature’s
attempts to legalize and regulate sports betting, within the
State.215 A legislative and judicial victory for New Jersey in
this matter would represent a monumental step in the right
direction, as it would enable states to tap into immense
revenue potential, render the sports betting black market
obsolete and inutile, impose regulations on gambling
activities that have gone largely unchecked, and introduce
new consumer protection mechanisms.
A. New Jersey’s Ongoing Fight Against PASPA
When Congress initially enacted PASPA in 1992, it
effectively banned sports betting in every state, with the
exceptions of Nevada, Delaware, Oregon, and Montana,
which had all previously adopted various forms of legal,

214. See Mary K. Braza, Gambling with SCOTUS: Christie v. NCAA, NAT’L L.
REV. (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/gambling-scotuschristie-v-ncaa; Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Christie_v._NCAA (last visited Apr. 16,
2018) [hereinafter BALLOTPEDIA]; December 2017 Preview: Christie v. National
Collegiate
Athletic
Association,
GEO.
WASH. L.
REV.:
DOCKET,
https://www.gwlr.org/december-2017-preview-christie-v-national-collegiateathletic-association/ [hereinafter Preview]; Dustin Gouker, Everything You Need
To Know About The NJ Sports Betting Supreme Court Case, LEGAL SPORTS REP.
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/16737/nj-sports-betting-scotuspreview/ (hereinafter Gouker, Sports Betting Supreme Court Case); Michelle
Minton, The Importance of an Under-the-Radar Supreme Court Case on Sports
Betting,
COMPETITIVE
ENTERPRISE
INST.
(Oct.
16,
2017),
https://cei.org/blog/importance-under-radar-supreme-court-case-sports-betting;
Axel Schamis & Katherine Van Bramer, Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/16-476 (last
visited Apr. 16, 2018).
215. Dustin Gouker, New Jersey Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Mar. 22,
2017), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/nj/.
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state-sanctioned sports betting or lotteries.216 Additionally,
PASPA provided New Jersey with a special one-year window,
during which time the state could enact its own sports
betting regime; however, the New Jersey legislature was
unable to pass any such authorization for state-sponsored
sports betting within that permissible time period prior to
PASPA taking effect.217 Nineteen years later, in 2011, New
Jersey publicly reopened their considerations of a statesponsored sports betting program by holding a referendum
on the issue, asking voters whether the state constitution
should be amended to allow for legalized gambling on
sporting events.218 Voters overwhelmingly voiced their
support for legalized sports betting in New Jersey: sixty-four
percent of voters supported the constitutional amendment,
and the state legislature subsequently moved forward by
enacting the Sports Wagering Act in 2012.219
The Sports Wagering Act legalized and regulated sports
betting, but restricted such activity to a limited number of
designated casinos and racetracks throughout the state.220
However, the Act was short-lived, as the NCAA, NBA, NFL,
NHL, and MLB filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate the New
Jersey law as a violation of PASPA.221 For its part, the State
of New Jersey, led by Governor Chris Christie, admitted that
the law was a facial violation of PASPA, but argued that
PASPA itself was unconstitutional under the Tenth
Amendment—the law sought to utilize the several states,
and their respective legislatures, as vehicles to implement
and enforce federal gambling policy interests.222 This,

216. Preview, supra note 214; Schamis & Van Bramer, supra note 214.
217. See Schamis & Van Bramer, supra note 214.
218. See id.
219. Id; see Minton, supra note 214.
220. See BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 214; Schamis & Van Bramer, supra note
214.
221. See BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 214.
222. See id.
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Christie argued, contravened the fundamental principles of
federalism, and more specifically the “anti-commandeering
doctrine,” which prevents the federal government from
simply dictating state law.223 Furthermore, this is
particularly true in cases, such as this one, where Congress
itself arguably had the authority to pass a federal gambling
regulatory and enforcement scheme pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, which likely would have lawfully
preempted any contrary state legislative actions thereafter,
but elected not to do so and to instead rely on the states to
implement and carry out a federal policy initiative.224
Ultimately, both the district court and the Third Circuit
ruled in favor of the leagues, in what became known as the
Christie I cases, and upheld the constitutionality of PASPA,
stating that New Jersey could not affirmatively authorize
sports betting, and thereby disregard the terms of PASPA;
however, the Third Circuit indicated that the federal law
would not prohibit a potential repeal of existing state
gambling prohibitions.225 Due to the fact that PASPA, a
federal law, was structured so as to rely on the maintenance
and enforcement of state laws prohibiting gambling, a repeal
of the state sports betting ban would effectively render
PASPA obsolete within the state.
In accordance with the Third Circuit’s holding in Christie
I, New Jersey changed course and tried a different approach
in 2014, when the state legislature passed Senate Bill
2460.226 This new law did not affirmatively authorize sports
betting anywhere in the state; instead, Senate Bill 2460
partially repealed existing state bans on sports betting at
223. See id; Braza, supra note 214; Minton, supra note 214; Schamis & Van
Bramer, supra note 214.
224. Michelle Minton, Supreme Court Could Hand Down Game-Changing
Ruling for Sports Betting, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://cei.org/blog/supreme-court-could-hand-down-game-changing-rulingsports-betting.
225. See Schamis & Van Bramer, supra note 214.
226. Id; see BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 214.
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casinos and racetracks throughout the state, for individuals
who are at least twenty-one-years-old.227 However, the
NCAA and four major professional sports leagues again filed
suit, and the district court once more struck down the state
law, this time holding that the state had two options: either
keep their existing state prohibitions on sports gambling
entirely in place, or completely repeal them.228 On appeal,
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s overall holding;
but that is where New Jersey’s luck ostensibly began to
change, because, unlike Christie I, this time the Third
Circuit agreed to re-hear the case en banc.229 Yet, once again,
the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling in favor of the sports
leagues, essentially stating PASPA was not unconstitutional
commandeering of state legislative authority, and that the
2014 law was a violation of PASPA because it acted as an
affirmative authorization to gamble at specific locations and
on specific sports, even if it was artfully couched as a
repeal.230
Perhaps sensing inherent danger in striking down this
partial repeal attempt on the basis that it was actually an
affirmative authorization, particularly in light of its holding
in Christie I, the Court of Appeals then attempted to distance
itself somewhat from that prior decision, which, at the time,
attempted to draw a formal distinction between affirmative
authorizations and repeals.231 Nonetheless, Circuit Judge
Julio Fuentes wrote a passionate dissent centering on this
very jurisprudential inconsistency, opining that the 2014
repeal contained “no explicit grant of permission” and that
the law simply acted as “a self-executing deregulatory
measure,” and furthermore, that the majority inferred an

227. Schamis & Van Bramer, supra note 214.
228. BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 214.
229. Gouker, Sports Betting Supreme Court Case, supra note 214.
230. See Schamis & Van Bramer, supra note 214.
231. See id. (“disclaiming the formal distinction in Christie I between repeals
and affirmative authorizations as dicta”).
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authorization where one did not exist.232 Additionally, Judge
Fuentes lamented the fact that the majority opinion “[failed]
to explain why a partial repeal is equivalent to a [legal] grant
of permission to engage in sports betting,” which would prove
to be a critical point in the case moving forward.233 The
danger in viewing a partial repeal of existing state law as an
affirmative authorization is that it implies that only a total
repeal of all state gambling laws will suffice under the
requirements of PASPA, and, in fact, this is exactly what the
District Court held in Christie II, likely based on the
distinction between affirmative authorizations and repeals
that the Court of Appeals had previously drawn in Christie
I. However, if this interpretation of PASPA is accurate, and
a partial repeal does amount to an affirmative authorization,
then it puts states in a terrible position where their
proverbial hands are essentially tied to their existing
gambling prohibitions, unless they were to completely
deregulate all sports gambling within their states, thereby
necessarily allowing gambling on all sports, at all locations,
by people of all ages, and without any ability for the state to
license,
regulate,
introduce
consumer
protection
mechanisms, or generate revenue from the activity.
Following their latest Third Circuit Court of Appeals
loss, the State of New Jersey once again petitioned the
Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari, which
seemed extremely unlikely, after the state had previously
been denied certiorari in Christie I.234 Furthermore, after the
Supreme Court requested an opinion from the U.S. Solicitor
General as to whether or not the Court should hear the case,
and the Solicitor General recommended that the Court not
take up New Jersey’s appeal, it finally seemed like the end

232. NCAA v. Christie, 832 F.3d 389, 404–05 (3d Cir. 2016) (Fuentes, J.,
dissenting); BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 214.
233. Christie, 832 F.3d at 405.
234. See Gouker, Sports Betting Supreme Court Case, supra note 214.
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of the line for sports betting in New Jersey.235 Yet, in a rather
stunning turn of events, the Supreme Court granted New
Jersey’s petition for certiorari, meaning that at least four
Supreme Court Justices felt that the case was worth
hearing.236
Although the rationale for the Supreme Court Justices’
collective change of heart with respect to its interest in the
constitutionality of PASPA remains unknown, it is entirely
possible that the State of West Virginia factored heavily into
their decision. At the time of the certiorari petition, West
Virginia, which submitted an amicus brief in support of New
Jersey’s position, had pending legislation that would have
legalized sports betting within the state, irrespective of
PASPA’s ongoing existence.237 Furthermore, when the
inevitable legal challenge from the sports leagues came in
opposition to West Virginia’s law, that case would have gone
through the more conservative, federalist-minded Fourth
Circuit.238 Therefore, it is quite conceivable that the Supreme
Court would have been confronted with deciding the
constitutionality of PASPA in the face of a looming circuit
split, within a matter of a few years anyway.
B. The Supreme Court Considers the Constitutionality of
PASPA
The central issue for the Supreme Court to decide in
Murphy v. NCAA is whether PASPA violates the Tenth
Amendment and the overarching principles of constitutional

235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Dustin Gouker, Five States Join New Jersey in Sports Betting Case with
Supreme
Court
Filing,
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Nov.
14,
2016),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/12101/five-states-join-new-jersey-sportsbetting-case-in-favor/; Dustin Gouker, Another Sports Betting Legalization Bill
Joins the Chorus This Time in West Virginia, LEGAL SPORTS REP (March 2, 2017),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/13227/west-virginia-sports-betting/.
238. Id.
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federalism.239 In particular, the argument centers around
the “anti-commandeering doctrine,” which stands for the
idea that the federal government, acting through Congress,
cannot compel states to implement federal legislative or
policy initiatives, such as requiring states to prohibit
gambling on sports, when Congress itself could have
implemented such a prohibition.240 New Jersey argues that
PASPA does in fact commandeer state legislatures, whereas
the NCAA and professional sports leagues contend that
PASPA is a wholly constitutional federal preemption of
conflicting state law.241
The origins of the anti-commandeering doctrine can be
traced all the way back to the nineteenth century and, more
specifically, the era of slavery in the United States.242 In
response to the “Extradition Clause” and the “Fugitive Slave
Clause” of the U.S. Constitution, in addition to the 1793
“Fugitive Slave Act,” the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
passed a law prohibiting individuals from forcibly removing
slaves from the commonwealth with the intention of
returning them to slavery, in direct contravention of the
aforementioned federal laws which generally provided for
the return of escaped slaves to their owners.243 This conflict
eventually led to the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, in which
the Supreme Court struck down the Pennsylvania law on the
basis of the Supremacy Clause, and held that the
Pennsylvania law was preempted by the Fugitive Slave Act

239. See Minton, supra note 214. The reader should note that this case was
formerly stylized, “Christie v. NCAA,” but was appropriately changed upon Phil
Murphy’s assumption of the New Jersey governorship on January 16, 2018.
References to “Christie v. NCAA” in article titles and otherwise refer to Murphy
v. NCAA, 584 U.S. ___, Nos. 16-476, 16-477, 2017 WL 684747 (2018).
240. Id; BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 214.
241. Brief for Respondents at 19, Murphy v. NCAA, Nos. 16-476, 16-477, 2017
WL 684747 at *7.
242. Minton, supra note 214.
243. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 539 (1842).
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and the Constitution.244 However, in the majority opinion,
Justice Joseph Story wrote that, while the states could not
interfere or prohibit people from returning escaped slaves in
accordance with the Fugitive Slave Act, Congress could not
force states to implement corresponding laws or to assist
individuals or the federal government in carrying out the
Fugitive Slave Act.245 In relevant part, Story stated:
The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce [federal laws];
and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the
power of interpretation, to insist, that the states are bound to
provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national
government, nowhere delegated or intrusted [sic] to them by the
Constitution.246

In other words, the federal Fugitive Slave Act was the
exclusive province of the federal government to enforce, and
it could not compel the states to participate in the execution
of the law.
The impact of Justice Story’s interpretations of
federalism in Prigg would be lasting, even if seemingly
dormant for a number of years thereafter. Additionally,
although the ignominious holding in Prigg lands the case
firmly in the Supreme Court “anti-canon” of cases, the
parallel between Justice Story’s interpretation of dual
sovereignty, and the modern “anti-commandeering”
jurisprudence, is plainly apparent. Moreover, the rationales
and constitutional interpretations behind some anti-canon
holdings have seemingly stood the test of time, though the
socially and morally repugnant institutions and ends that
these interpretations were once employed to buoy, have
fortunately long since died off.247
244. See Prigg, 41 U.S. at 541–42.
245. Id at 615.
246. Id. at 615–16.
247. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 380, 475 (2011)
(noting the “reality that constitutional interpretation is often . . . susceptible to
otherwise appropriate use for tragic ends”); See also Jeffrey M. Schmitt,
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Following Prigg, the first modern appearance of the
“anti-commandeering doctrine,” and the first time the court
phrased it as “commandeering,” came over a century later, in
the 1992 case of New York v. United States, in which a federal
policy for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste was at
issue.248 In striking down the federal act’s “take title
provision,” the Court, in a decision authored by Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, noted that “Congress may not simply
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.’”249 Furthermore, the opinion pointed
out that “[w]hile Congress has substantial powers to govern
the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to
the States, the Constitution has never been understood to
confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
govern according to Congress’ instructions.”250 Then, in the
1997 case of Printz v. United States, a portion of the Brady
Gun Bill was struck down because it required the states and
local municipalities to administer a federal background
check program.251 Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin
Scalia cited the Court’s earlier holding in New York, and
observed that Congress
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer
or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether
Immigration Enforcement Reform: Learning from the History of Fugitive Slave
Rendition, 103 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2013) (Citing the nineteenth century ruling in
Prigg, with respect to the Fugitive Slave Act, as a parallel between states
employing ostensibly legal noncooperation tactics, in furtherance of the anticommandeering doctrine, in the face of modern federal attempts to dictate certain
immigration policies to states and their officials).
248. Mike Maharrey, States Don’t Have to Comply: The Anti-Commandeering
Doctrine,
TENTH
AMENDMENT
CTR.
(Dec.
28,
2013),
http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2013/12/28/states-dont-have-to-comply-theanti-comandeering-doctrine/.
249. Id; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
250. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
251. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 899 (1997); Maharrey, supra
note 248.
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policymaking is involved . . . such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.252

Finally, in the 2012 case of National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John
Roberts, writing for the majority, again cited the holding in
New York as standing for the principle that Congress may
not “require the States to govern according to Congress’
instructions” and further noted that “[o]therwise the twogovernment system established by the Framers would give
way to a system that vests power in one central government,
and individual liberty would suffer.”253
This lineage of anti-commandeering doctrine Supreme
Court cases is the cornerstone of New Jersey’s current
argument
before
the
Court,
concerning
the
254
constitutionality—or lack thereof—of PASPA. First, New
Jersey emphasizes the importance of maintaining the
prohibition on Congress’ ability to “commandeer” state
legislatures to our overall federalist system and the division
of federal and state authority.255 If Congress were allowed to
dictate the substance of state laws, New Jersey argues, the
lines of political accountability would be blurred, and state
legislatures, which, relative to Congress, are better
positioned to address and answer to the concerns of state
residents—would be handcuffed and unable to respond to
their electorates, thereby treading upon individual
liberties.256 Furthermore, New Jersey contends that
preventing a state from repealing an existing legal
prohibition, particularly where the state constituents have
already democratically expressed their disfavor for that
prohibition, is just as repugnant to the principles of
252. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
253. Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577 (2012).
254. Brief for Petitioners at 16, Murphy v. NCAA, No. 16-476, 2017 WL
3774486 at *4.
255. See id. at 16–17.
256. Id. at 17.
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federalism as a federal directive to enact such a
prohibition.257 In other words, forcing a state to leave an
unpopular state law on the books is essentially equivalent to
ordering the state to pass such a law in the first place. In
both cases, the state’s constitutionally protected police
powers are being overridden, even in an area where Congress
itself has not implemented any sort of federal regulatory
measure or legislative prohibition.258
Moreover, New Jersey has made a powerful case that,
not only does PASPA force the state to leave an unpopular
law in place, but since much of the state’s original gambling
prohibition was repealed under the 2014 bill, the federal
government, operating through PASPA, is actually
commandeering the state legislature and directing it to
implement a new law that prohibits gambling within the
state.259 Therefore, while the Court of Appeals did not feel as
though PASPA could be deemed commandeering because the
Court did not view the federal law as requiring any
affirmative action on the part of the states, in New Jersey’s
case, it actually would require the affirmative
implementation of a state law. Additionally, the Court of
Appeals did not find PASPA to be coercive, and therefore
constitutional; yet, by invalidating the partial repeal
attempt, it really leaves the state with no legitimate
alternative, and certainly not a realistic option, other than
re-implementing and then maintaining the state law
prohibition on gambling.260 The only other, seemingly legal,
alternative would be to eliminate all gambling prohibitions
within the state, which would be demonstrably reprehensible
for a multitude of public policy reasons, and therefore really
not a legitimate choice at all. This public policy rationale,
alone, indicates the inherent coercion in PASPA, and those

257. Id. at 17–18.
258. See id. at 19.
259. See id. at 18.
260. See id. at 19.
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underlying policy considerations, coupled with the inability
to regulate or license gambling within the state, leaves no
conceivable incentives for the state to move forward with an
unchecked liberalization of the activity.
On the other hand, the NCAA and the professional sports
leagues maintain that PASPA cannot be an example of
federal commandeering because the law does not command
New Jersey to take any affirmative legislative or
enforcement action, and only tells the state what it cannot
do.261 However, as was previously discussed, the contention
that PASPA does not direct any state legislative acts is
rather dubious, particularly in the wake of the 2014 partial
repeal of the state gambling prohibition. Furthermore, the
NCAA roots the core of its PASPA defense in the Supremacy
Clause, and the notion that PASPA is a wholly constitutional
preemption of conflicting state law, in an area of interstate
commerce where Congress has the authority to legislate.262
Yet, this argument is also somewhat questionable, since
PASPA itself does not implement any federal regulatory or
enforcement program, nor does it ban gambling; instead, the
law relies entirely on state gambling prohibitions and state
enforcement, in order to give it effect.
As of this writing, the Supreme Court has yet to issue a
ruling in Murphy; however, based on how both parties’
arguments were ostensibly received during oral arguments,
early indications are that the Court is likely to reverse the
Court of Appeals’ decision and render a verdict in favor of
New Jersey.263 In deciding this case, the Court has several
261. Brief for Respondents at 19–20, Murphy v. NCAA, Nos. 16-476, 16-477,
2017 WL 684747 at *7–8.
262. Id. at 18, 20–21.
263. Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Seem to Side with State on Sports
Betting, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 4, 2017, 2:51 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/
12/argument-analysis-justices-seem-side-state-sports-betting/; Minton, supra
note 224; Ilya Somin, Place Your Bets on Federalism—Thoughts on Today’s Oral
Argument in Christie v. NCAA, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/12/04/placeyour-bets-on-federalism-thoughts-on-todays-oral-argument-in-christie-v-ncaa/?u
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options, but given the strong case that New Jersey has
presented, the likeliest outcomes are that the Court will
either invalidate PASPA altogether by declaring it to be
unconstitutional, or, in the alternative, keep the law in place
while also allowing New Jersey to implement its partial
repeal.264 Given the conservative majority on the Court, and
the inherent juxtaposition between the social concerns
presented by gambling, and the competing fundamental
federalist interest of allowing states to exercise their
sovereignty in governance, it is perhaps more likely that the
Court will hedge to some extent and go with the latter
approach, thereby allowing PASPA to exist indefinitely,
while granting states like New Jersey the discretion to
legislate out from under the law, should they elect to do so.
However, the momentum behind striking down PASPA
altogether has certainly never been stronger; as such, a
Supreme Court determination that the law is wholly
unconstitutional certainly remains a distinct possibility.
Such an outcome seems especially conceivable in light of
the Supreme Court Justices’ apparent receptiveness toward
New Jersey’s claims with respect to the Tenth
Amendment.265 To be sure, during oral arguments, Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan all seemed to entertain the
idea that PASPA was in fact simply a lawful federal
preemption under the Supremacy Clause.266 However,
Justice Kagan also seemed to be genuinely concerned that
there really is no distinction between telling a state they
must pass a certain law, and telling them they must keep a
certain law in place.267 Moreover, Justice Kennedy and,
perhaps most crucially for New Jersey, Justice Breyer, both
seemed to find the law to be a violation of the anti-

tm_term=.7ddadb456b80.
264. Gouker, Sports Betting Supreme Court Case, supra note 214.
265. Howe, supra note 263.
266. Somin, supra note 263.
267. Id.
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commandeering doctrine.268 Kennedy, who once famously
advocated for the import of states’ roles as “laboratories for
experimentation”
under
the
federalist
system, 269
unequivocally expressed his view of New Jersey’s plight
under PASPA when he stated that the federal law “leaves in
place a state law that the state does not want, so the citizens
of the State of New Jersey are bound to obey a law that the
state doesn’t want but that the federal government compels
the state to have. That seems commandeering.”270 Kennedy
also pointed out that laws such as PASPA “blur[ ] political
accountability” between the states and federal government,
and that such an outcome is “precisely what federalism is
designed to prevent.”271 Breyer seemed to agree in matter-offactly stating: “the subject matter of this law is the state.
That’s what this is about, telling states what to do, and
therefore, it falls within commandeering.”272 Moreover, Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both seemed to take issue
with the fact that the federal government could have
prohibited gambling itself if it wanted to do so, therefore
implying that the NCAA’s interpretation of PASPA was
either incorrect, or that the law itself was overreaching.273
The Chief Justice was also not at all receptive to the NCAA’s
suggestion that the State of New Jersey could legalize all
sports betting if it wanted to, but that it could not partially
legalize it or regulate it in any way, as that would amount to
an affirmative authorization; in fact, Roberts incredulously
asked the Solicitor General, who was arguing on behalf of the
NCAA, if he had “no problem at all [with] anyone [engaging]
in any kind of gambling they want, including a twelve-year-

268. Id.
269. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
270. Somin, supra note 263.
271. Howe, supra note 263.
272. Somin, supra note 263.
273. Howe, supra note 263.
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old going to a casino?”274 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch did not
seem comfortable with the idea of the federal government
passing laws that pawned off regulation and enforcement
responsibilities, and the inherent expenses thereof, onto the
states.275 Meanwhile, as is typically the case, Justice Thomas
remained silent during oral arguments, but since he
generally places great value on the legislative sovereignty of
states and limitations on the power of the federal
government, he seems to be a safe bet to also side with New
Jersey on this issue.276
Taken together, it certainly seems as though the
Supreme Court is primed for a landmark decision, in favor of
both New Jersey and the institution of federalism itself.277
Even if the Court were to conclude that PASPA is not
technically a textbook example of commandeering or
conscripting the state legislature, it is still a facial regulation
of what the state legislature can and cannot do in the absence
of a federal regulatory or enforcement program, and
therefore seemingly an infringement on state sovereignty
under the Tenth Amendment. Further fueling this
momentum for leaving states to their legislative devices is
the current social and political landscape throughout the
United States. The implications of the looming Supreme
Court decision will be monumental and extremely broad in
scope, as a number of other current issues, such as marijuana
liberalization and the existence of, and federal policies
toward, sanctuary cities, will greatly depend on the decision
in Murphy.278

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Somin, supra note 263.
277. Adam Edelman, Cash-Hungry States Betting Supreme Court Will Legalize
Sports
Gambling,
NBC
NEWS
(Feb.
12,
2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/cash-hungry-states-betting-supr
eme-court-will-legalize-sports-gambling-n846676; Howe, supra note 263; id.
278. BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 214; Howe, supra note 263; Minton, supra note
214.
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In the case of marijuana policy, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions seems primed to wage war on the states that have
already decriminalized or overtly legalized marijuana usage,
to varying degrees.279 A ruling against New Jersey, and in
favor of PASPA’s constitutionality and legislative reach, in
Murphy, will bolster Sessions’ authority to dictate state
marijuana policies and the enforcement thereof, and thereby
present a tremendous threat to state sovereignty.280
Moreover, the Trump administration’s current policies
aimed at punishing “sanctuary cities” that refuse to comply
with federal immigration laws and enforcement standards,
by withholding federal funds otherwise earmarked for those
cities, also seem to be facially coercive practices and flagrant
violations of the anti-commandeering doctrine.281 However,
a ruling against New Jersey in Murphy could have huge
ramifications in terms of reinforcing and validating the
federal government’s utilization of such practices. The
Supreme Court Justices are almost certainly aware of the
implications that would stem from a ruling in favor of the
NCAA and PASPA, namely that such a verdict would be
viewed as an implicit endorsement of these other
contemporaneous federal attempts to exercise influence and
control within the states, and the inherent dangers thereof.
Therefore, viewing New Jersey’s anti-commandeering
argument in light of these other concurrent social and
political issues seems to further tip the proverbial scales of
justice in favor of New Jersey’s position.
Still though, it remains entirely possible that the
Supreme Court will once again surprise those closely
279. Paul Seaborn, Jeff Sessions Isn’t Hurting the Marijuana Legalization
Campaign—He’s Helping It, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2018),
http://www.businessinsider.com/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-is-helpingmarijuana-legalization-2018-2.
280. See Minton, supra note 214; Somin, supra note 263.
281. Natalie Delgadillo, Trump’s ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Policy Is Likely to Lose in
Court, GOVERNING (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/publicjustice-safety/gov-sanctuary-cities-sessions-chicago-lawsuit-trumpfunding.html; see also BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 214.
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monitoring New Jersey’s ongoing endeavor to surmount the
obstacles presented by PASPA and somewhat inexplicably
issue a verdict in favor of the NCAA. Should this occur, it
would be a huge blow to every state looking to introduce their
own regulated and licensed state-sponsored sports betting
regime. Yet, as discouraging as such an outcome would seem
for the future of liberalized gambling policies, it remains very
unlikely that the momentum behind relaxing gambling
restrictions would grind to a halt altogether. An act of
Congress could still eliminate the impediments presented by
PASPA once and for all, and the political and social climate
may be just right for such legislation to pass. Additionally,
as is seemingly the case with the marijuana liberalization
saga, when federal officials begin to push back against the
momentum for loosening restrictions on individual liberty, it
can actually provide the necessary impetus to put the
legislative gears in motion, particularly when such policies
are already gaining wide support at the state level.282
C. The Landscape for Increased Liberalization, Beyond
Murphy
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis of the
dispute surrounding the daily fantasy sports industry in the
earlier portions of this Comment, it seems safe to conclude
that daily fantasy sports themselves are, in fact, a form of
online gambling. This is abundantly evident based on the
contingencies that are laced throughout the contests,
including the performance of players, game-time weather
conditions, and unforeseeable nature of player injuries.
Furthermore, the companies themselves privately branded
their products as being akin to traditional gambling

282. See Ryan Rodenberg, How The DOJ Revision of Marijuana Policy Could
Impact The Supreme Court Sports Betting Case, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 4, 2018,
10:26 AM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/17313/doj-marijuana-policy-andsports-betting/.
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operations in their pitches to investors.283 Moreover, at its
inception, FanDuel (and later DraftKings) admittedly sought
to replace online poker companies and sportsbooks that were
indisputably gambling operations, after UIGEA eradicated
them from the U.S. market, and to this end, the daily fantasy
model was carefully tailored to UIGEA in order to give the
initial semblance of legal compliance.284 This confluence of
facts and events makes it abundantly clear that daily fantasy
sports is a form of gambling, irrespective of the legislative
actions that states have taken to the contrary.
As is the case in New Jersey, PASPA currently prohibits
the legalization of sports gambling in a total of forty-six
states; therefore, while defining daily fantasy sports as legal
“games of skill” is a relatively inventive and convenient way
to circumvent a legal conflict with PASPA, the reality of the
situation remains unchanged. To be sure, there is a
“knowledge” or “skill” element to fantasy sports, which
manifests itself in the act of selecting players, but once these
selections are made, a participant’s fate is inextricably
intertwined with the real-life performance of the selected
players, something that no daily fantasy participant could
ever purport to have control over, regardless of their relative
levels of knowledge and skill. This is similar to the position
a blackjack player is in at a casino: a certain degree of
knowledge can help a player to some extent, but only to a
point. For example, a blackjack player could wisely decide to
not “hit on 18,” but at that point, the player’s fate is wholly
removed from his or her control, to be determined only by
whatever the dealer’s cards end up showing. As such, daily
fantasy sports would undoubtedly fail to meet an honest
application of either the “material element test” or the
“modicum of chance” standard at the state level. Ultimately,
based on the nature of the contests and aforementioned
contingencies, daily fantasy sports would almost certainly

283. See Van Natta, supra note 1.
284. See id.
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fail under the “predominant purpose test” as well, though an
argument to the contrary could at least be invoked under
that standard.
Yet, as we have seen, states have increasingly
demonstrated an encouraging willingness to legalize,
regulate, and tax daily fantasy sports.285 This provides a
truly advantageous scenario, under which all parties stand
to benefit: the daily fantasy industry can endure, if not
thrive, while the consumer gets much-needed regulatory
protections, competitive safeguards, and transparency, and
the states reap the benefits of increased revenue. The fact
that states are recognizing the benefits of such arrangements
certainly bodes well for the future of legalized sports betting.
Equally important in this analysis is the support from the
professional sports leagues for daily fantasy sports, as these
leagues will likely have a pivotal role in shaping the
landscape of a legalized and regulated sports betting
environment, irrespective of the future impact of PASPA, a
legislative act which they are primarily responsible for.286
As has been previously discussed, the judicial outcome in
New Jersey’s most recent attempt to legalize sports betting
will largely determine the fate of PASPA, which will in turn
have ramifications in states throughout the country. As of
the time of this writing, the states of California, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, and West Virginia have pending legislation to
introduce legalized sports betting in their respective
states.287 The current holdup on most of those bills, and the
reason why none of these states have yet brought a PASPA
challenge of their own, is that most of the bills are “stand-by
285. Kirsner, supra note 208.
286. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 139; Van Natta, supra note 1.
287. Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Daily Fantasy Sports, supra note 210; Ryan
Rodenberg, Sports Betting Bill Tracker, ESPN (Apr. 1, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/gambling-sports-betting-bill-tra
cker-all-50-states.
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bills” that are tied to a future contingency, such as an
amendment or repeal of PASPA.288 Furthermore, in addition
to New Jersey, the states of Connecticut, Mississippi, and
Pennsylvania have already enacted legislation to implement
legal and regulated sports betting programs.289
In any event, regardless of the eventual outcome of the
New Jersey case, federal lawmakers should strongly consider
the multitude of policy reasons for repealing PASPA, not the
least of which are the billions of dollars that change hands
annually, as the direct result of illegal sports betting
operations. In both 2017 and 2018, the Super Bowl generated
$4.7 billion in bets, by itself; and an estimated ninety-seven
percent of these bets were illegally placed, as per the
American Gaming Association.290 Senator John McCain,
once a staunch opponent of sports betting, has recently gone
on record stating that he believes that Congress should
reconsider the idea of legalizing and regulating sports
betting.291
Even the professional sports leagues themselves seem to
be increasingly supportive of the idea. NBA Commissioner
Adam Silver surprised many when he voiced his support for
a legalized, regulated sports betting market. Moreover, the
NBA and MLB, seemingly in preparation for a gamblingfriendly verdict in Murphy, are actively lobbying at the state
level for one-percent of state-sponsored sports betting
revenue to go to the leagues, in the form of an “integrity

288. Gouker, Sports Betting Supreme Court Case, supra note 214.
289. Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Daily Fantasy Sports, supra note 210;
Rodenberg, supra note 287.
290. Thomas Barrabi, Super Bowl Betting Total to Top $4.7B, with 97% Bet
Illegally, FOX BUSINESS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/
super-bowl-betting-total-to-top-4-7b-with-97-bet-illegally; David Purdum, AGA
Estimates Super Bowl LI to Generate $4.7B in Bets, Most of it Illegally Wagered,
ESPN (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/18590533/americangaming-association-estimates-super-bowl-li-generate-47b-bets-most-illegallywagered.
291. Purdum, supra note 290.
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fee.”292 Such a fee, the leagues argue, would help to regulate
and enforce transparent, legal gambling operations, and also
offset any threats to the leagues’ respective images and
public perceptions.293 Meanwhile, the NHL recently cast
gambling concerns aside when it introduced the first
professional sports franchise in Las Vegas, Nevada.294
Additionally, the NFL has approved the Oakland Raiders’
impending move to Las Vegas, with the thirty-two team
owners overwhelmingly lending their support, as evidenced
by the 31-1 vote on the proposed relocation.295
Furthering this momentum for repealing or modifying
PASPA was the 2016 election of President Donald J. Trump,
once a casino owner, himself.296 As the president of the
American Gaming Association, Geoff Freeman, phrased it:
“[there is] a perfect storm coming together . . . everyone is
acknowledging that we are better off having a regulated
environment.”297 Furthermore, the ongoing constitutional
questions surrounding PASPA, in conjunction with the
Republican Party’s traditional beliefs in state’s rights and
empowering state legislatures, and the fact that Republicans
now control both Congress and the Executive Branch at
minimum until 2019, makes the legislative environment
very conducive to passing legislation to legalize sports

292. Dustin Gouker, Why NBA, MLB Apparently Think They’re Going to Lose
the New Jersey Sports Betting Case, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Jan. 12, 2018),
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294. Cutler Klein, From Six Teams to 31: History of NHL Expansion, NHL.COM
(June 22, 2016), https://www.nhl.com/news/nhl-expansion-history/c-281005106.
295. Ken Belson & Victor Mather, Raiders Leaving Oakland Again, This Time
for Las Vegas, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/
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betting.298 For his part, Trump stated in 2015 that he is “OK
with [sports betting and daily fantasy sports] because it’s
happening anyway. Whether you have [legalized sports
betting] or you don’t have it, you have it.”299 As such,
notwithstanding the still unknown outcome of Murphy v.
NCAA, it is entirely possible, if not altogether likely, that
significant steps will be taken toward legalized sports
betting in the United States, over the next several years.
CONCLUSION
Today, the two leading daily fantasy sports companies
are still reeling as they attempt to recover from the stunning
events that catapulted their industry into legal turmoil and
pushed the two billion-dollar companies to the brink of
dissolution; however, the future suddenly looks bright for the
daily fantasy industry, once again. It will likely never be
what it once was, as it is almost inconceivable to envision
FanDuel and DraftKings ever engaging in marketing wars
in which they air commercials every ninety seconds and
openly boast of the millions of dollars they planned to give
away during a given week. In fact, the once bitter rivals were
at one point actively negotiating a humbling merger deal
designed to help the two companies recover and thrive again,
prior to federal regulators blocking the proposed merger
plan, due to monopolistic and market share concerns.300
However, while the recovery process may be slow, especially
with the merger option now off the table, FanDuel and
DraftKings seem primed to lead the industry into the future,
using their growing legal foothold to regain lost prominence
and expand their operations. Recently, in an effort to keep
298. Thomas Barrabi, How Donald Trump Could Help Legalize Sports Betting,
FOX BUSINESS (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/howdonald-trump-could-help-legalize-sports-betting/.
299. Id.
300. The Associated Press, DraftKings and FanDuel Call Off Merger, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/sports/draftkingsand-fanduel-call-off-merger.html.
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pace with market evolution and innovation, FanDuel even
introduced contests in which winners were paid in the
cryptocurrencies “Bitcoin” and “Dash.”301
Though it seems clear that daily fantasy sports products
are simply the latest variation of gambling, legalizing and
regulating the activity is the prudent move. This proposition
is plainly reflected and reinforced by the history of gambling
laws in the United States, over the course of the last halfcentury. First, the Wire Act sought to eradicate illegal horse
racing operations that relied on telegraph, and later,
telephone communications.302 However, other forms of
gambling subsequently increased in popularity, before the
advent of the Internet eventually gave rise to online
sportsbooks and poker sites. In response, the UIGEA
effectively eliminated these illicit activities, only to be
thwarted for several more years by the inception of the daily
fantasy sports industry, which developed to fill the void. The
trend is ostensibly well-established by now: with each
subsequent piece of legislation seeking to end black market
gambling, technological advancements and human ingenuity
devise a way to circumvent the law, and the cycle continues.
Therefore, it seems to be the logical option to simply
allow daily fantasy participants to continue enjoying daily
fantasy sports, with the protections that state and
government regulatory agencies can provide. It remains to
be seen which states will become the next to affirm the
legality of the daily fantasy companies’ operations, but given
the strong momentum for legalization, the growing number
of states who have already passed legalizing bills, and the
incentives for simultaneously enhancing consumer
safeguards, while increasing state revenues, it should not
take long for the next state to take an affirmative stance,
301. Daniel Roberts, Exclusive: FanDuel Launching NBA Contest with
Cryptocurrency
Prizes,
YAHOO
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(Feb.
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with respect to daily fantasy sports.
Meanwhile, there is a growing impetus for following a
similar path of legalization and regulation on the
concomitant issue of sports betting in the United States.
With political leaders, professional sports leagues, and state
governments showing historic and amalgamated support for
eradicating the black market for sports betting, an ongoing
challenge to the constitutionality of the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act before the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the developing legality of daily fantasy sports
serving as both a catalyst and guidepost, a significant step
toward liberalizing the current prohibitions on professional
sports wagering appears to be imminent.

Editor’s Note: This Comment was selected from our 2016–17 Note &
Comment competition. Simultaneous with its publishing, the Supreme Court released its decision in Murphy v. NCAA. As expected,
the Court ultimately did rule in favor of New Jersey on May 14, 2018,
striking down the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
in Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. ___, Nos. 16-476, 16-477, 2017 WL
684747 (2018).

